

Federal Railroad Administration Office of Railroad Safety Accident and Analysis Branch

Accident Investigation Report HQ-2021-1428

> Union Pacific Railway Separ, New Mexico May 24, 2021

Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report, including this one, made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.

SYNOPSIS

Synopsis

On May 24, 2021, at approximately 2:56 a.m., MDT, the Union Pacific Railroad (UP) intermodal train ZMQLC-23 (Train 1) handling 166 loads, 0 empties, at 9,895 feet and 6,766 trailing tons, derailed 38 intermodal cars (53 units) while moving west (timetable direction) along the Lordsburg Subdivision at a estimated speed of 65 mph at Milepost (MP) 1170.1, approximately 22 miles east of Lordsburg, New Mexico within Grant County. The derailment involved consist lines 18-55 with most of the cars coming to rest accordioned and on their side. Five of the derailed cars were 3-pack spine cars, which consist of 15 individual cars. Therefore, counting the five 3-pack cars with the individual well cars, there were a total of 38 cars. There were 3 derailed intermodal cars transporting HAZMAT listed as cars EMUHU 270174 (UN 19), UMXU 895951 (UN 1993), and UMXU 236896 (UN 1133; UN2796), but none were found to be compromised.

The method of operation for the Lordsburg Subdivision is by Traffic Control System, Centralized Traffic Control with Positive Train Control (PTC) overlay. The maximum authorized speed is 70 mph per the Lordsburg Subdivision Timetable effective May 10, 2019 – unless otherwise restricted. Train 1 had no speed restrictions according to Track Warrant 1820 issued on May 23, 2021 at Santa Teresa, New Mexico.

There were no injuries to the public nor the crew.

Amtrak's Sunset Limited 1 & 2 were impacted due to the derailment. Amtrak #2 was turned back west at Tucson, Arizona, becoming Amtrak Sunset Limited #1. In San Antonio, Texas, Amtrak #1 was turned back east, becoming Amtrak Sunset Limited #2. All other train schedules were terminated. Passengers were instead bussed between Tucson, AZ and San Antonio, TX.

The accident was not PTC preventable.

Weather at the time of the derailment was described as dark, clear and 52° F.

Total estimated damages were \$6,274,171 (Track: \$4,142,345 / Equipment: \$2,131,826).


The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) determined the probable cause to be: E60C broken flange.

U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration	FRA FAC	TUAL RAILI	PORT F	FRA File # HQ-UP-2021-0524-1428								
TRAIN SUMMARY												
1. Name of Railroad Opera	1a.	1a. Alphabetic Code			1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.							
Union Pacific Railroad Con	UP	UP			0521LA042							
GENERAL INFORMATION												
1. Name of Railroad or Other	Entity Responsib	le for Track Mainte		1a. Alphabetic Code			1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.					
Union Pacific Railroad Co		UP			0521LA042							
2. U.S. DOT Grade Crossing		3. Date of Accident/Incide 5/24/2021			4. Time of Accident/Incident 2:56 AM							
5. Type of Accident/Incident Derailment												
6. Cars Carrying HAZMAT 3								9. People Evacuated 0				
10. Subdivision												
11. Nearest City/Town	tenth) 13	h) 13. State Abbr. 14. Cou			5							
LORDSBURG	1170.	1170.10				HIDALGO						
15. Temperature (F)	16. Visibility		17. Weat	7. Weather 18. T			18. Type o	pe of Track				
	Dark		Clear	ear Ma			Main					
19. Track Name/Number	20. FRA Track Cla	A Track Class					l Track Density	22. Time Table Direction				
SIMN	Freight Trains-80	reight Trains-80, Passenger Tra				(gross to 15	ons in millions)	West				
23. PTC Preventable	24. Primary Cause (25. Coi	ntributing C								
No	[E60C] Broken f											

U.S. Department of Transport Federal Railroad Administra		FRA	FAC	CTU	JAL RA		RO	AD ACC	CIDE	IDENT REPORT FRA File # HQ-UP-2021-0524-1428							
OPERATING TRAIN #1																	
1. Type of Equipment Consist:											2. Was Equipment Attended? 3. Train N					nber/Symbol	
Freight Train										Yes ZMQLC-23						3	
4. Speed (recorded speed if available)	ed,	Code 5. Trailing Tons (gross excluding power units)				 6a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive? 0 = Not a remotely controlled operation 1 = Remote control portable transmitter 									Code		
R - Recorded E - Estimated 65.0	MPH	Е	6766	766				2 = Remote control portable transmitter 3 = Remote control portable transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter									
6. Type of Territory																	
Signalization:																	
Signaled																	
Method of Operation/Authority for Movement:																	
Direct Train Control																	
Supplemental/Adjun Q, J	ct Codes	:															
7. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initi	al and Number b. Position in Train c. Loaded (yes						/no)				e(s) tested for		Alcohol			
(1) First Involved (derailed, struck, etc.)	DTT	^T B 888683 62				yes		numbe	cohol use, e er that were priate box	positive in the		0		0			
(2) Causing (if							5			9. Was this consist tra			ansporting passeng				
mechanical, cause reported)	DTT	В 8886	83	62			yes									N/A	
10. Locomotive Units (Exclude EMU,	a. Head	Mi	d Trair	rain Rear Er			and 11. Cars (Include)		EMI		Load	led	Em	Empty			
DMU, and Cab				c. d. e			e. DMU, an				a.	b.	с.	d.		e.	
Car Locomotives.)		Manua	al Re	emote	Manual	Rer			omotives.)		Freight	Pass.	Freight	Pass.	(Caboose	
(1) Total in Train	2	0		0	0	2	2 (1) Total Consist		l in Equipment		116	0	0	0		0	
(2) Total Derailed	0	0		0	0	(0 (2) Total		Derailed		38	0	0	0	0		
12. Equipment Damage This Consist 13. Track, Signal, Way & Structure Damage 2131826 4142345																	
Number of Crew Members							Length of Time on Duty										
14. Engineers/Operators 15. Firemen			10	16. Conductors						18. Engineer/Operator			19. Conductor				
1		0	1			0		Hrs:	Hrs: 3 Mins:			26 ^{Hrs:}		Mins:	26		
Casualties to:		Railroad ployees		21. Train Passengers		22. Others		23. I	EOT Devi	ce?	Yes	24. Was I	verly Armed? Yes				
Fatal		0 0		0		0		25. Caboose Occupied by Crew?				w?					
Nonfatal		0					<u> </u>	0								1	
26. Latitude 32.185058000				27. Longitude -108.392619000													

UP ZMQLC-23 Derailment Separ, NM May 24, 2021 MP 1170.1 Lordsburg Sub

HQ-2021-1428



NARRATIVE

Circumstances Prior to the Accident

On May 23, 2021 Train 1 was called on duty at Santa Teresa, New Mexico at 11:30 p.m., MDT. Train 1 was comprised of 110 double-stack well cars and 10 spine cars. The train was powered with 4 locomotives (2 headend and 2 rear remote).

The train originated in Mesquite, Texas where all required mechanical (locomotive/car) inspections were completed on May 23, 2021, at 5:30 a.m., CDT before departure. Train 1's crew consisted of an Engineer and Conductor, both of whom had received the statutorily required rest prior to reporting for duty.

Train 1 departed Santa Teresa, New Mexico at midnight on May 24, 2021 with no work or change in consist scheduled. The crew did not report any train handling issues prior to the derailment.

At the time of the accident, the Engineer was seated at the controls on the forward right side of the leading locomotive, while the Conductor was seated on the left side of the lead locomotive.

The Accident

At approximately 2:56 a.m., MDT, Train 1 reached MP 1170.1 at an estimated speed of 65 mph where it encountered an emergency application of train brakes. Upon inspection, the crew reported 40-50 cars derailed. The derailment involved lines 18-55, which included five 3-pack spine cars for a total of 53 cars. Most of the derailed cars were accordioned and turned over.

There were no injuries to the train crew or the public, and no hazardous material involved in the accident requiring remediation.

The FRA responded to the accident along with UP personnel.

Post-Accident Investigation

FRA and UP investigated the accident.

Analysis & Conclusions

Analysis – Toxicological: This accident met the minimum requirements of 49 CFR §219 toxicological testing was accomplished. Federal Railroad Administration Post-Accident Forensic Toxicology Result Reports indicate the two employees tested each had negative test results.

Conclusion: FRA determined neither drugs or alcohol contributed to the cause or severity of the accident. Analysis – Operating Practices: The Engineer and Conductor were found to be compliant with all applicable FRA Regulations, railroad operating rules and train handling rules and requirements. The relevant event recorder data was downloaded by UP and analyzed by UP and FRA with no exceptions noted.

Conclusion: FRA determined operating practices did not contribute to the cause or severity of the accident.

Analysis Special Human Factors: FRA obtained fatigue-related information, including work history, for all train operating employees involved in this accident. FRA uses an overall effectiveness rate of 63 as the baseline for fatigue analysis. This is the level at which the risk of a human factors related accident is calculated to be equal to chance. Any schedule that violates the overall effectiveness rate on the date of the accident or in the days leading up to the accident are considered to be at risk of fatigue contributing to the accident. The higher the FAID score, the higher the fatigue exposure. Below this baseline, fatigue is not considered as probable for an employee. Software sleep settings vary according to information

obtained from each employee. If an employee does not provide sleep information, FRA uses the default software settings.

Conclusion: FRA concluded that fatigue did not contribute to the cause or severity of the accident. Analysis Mechanical: FRA and UP Mechanical inspectors found a broken wheel on car DTTB 888683, due to an internal flange defect on wheel L-5. The defective flange was collected by UP.

Conclusion: FRA and UP determined the probable cause of the accident to be: E60C broken flange. Analysis Track & Structures: UP's Lordsburg Subdivision consists of 309 miles of double main track. The Subdivision extends timetable west between El Paso Texas to Tucson Arizona. Trains operating on the Lordsburg Subdivision utilize a combination of Yard Limits, and Centralized Traffic Control as methods of operation.

The Lordsburg Subdivision track is constructed of a combination of both wood and concrete ties. The running rail section consisted of 136-pound RE control cooled (CC) W-P continuous welded rail manufactured in 2004 at point of derailment. The running rails were fastened to the concrete crossties with premium fasteners to secure the track gauge and longitudinal forces on track structure.

FRA investigators reviewed the technical data provided by UP Railroad and the FRA track inspection car covering the last geometry car surveys and rail detector car reports. No defective conditions were recorded within or near the limits of the derailment.

UP has not had any major capital projects in this area over the past 5 months with just routine maintenance preformed.

Conclusion: FRA determined that neither track or structures contributed to the cause or severity of the derailment.

Overall Conclusion: FRA concluded the condition or functionality of the crew, locomotives, or safety appurtenances did not contribute to the cause or severity of the accident. The internal flange defect on the L-5 wheel of car DTTB 888683 was the sole cause of the accident.

Probable Cause: The FRA determined the probable cause to be: E60C broken flange.