

1. Name of Railroad Operating Train #1 CSX Transportation [CSX]			1a. Alphabetic Code CSX			1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. 000044919		
2. Name of Railroad Operating Train #2 CSX Transportation [CSX]			2a. Alphabetic Code CSX			2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. 000044919		
3. Name of Railroad Operating Train #3 N/A			3a. Alphabetic Code N/A			3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. N/A		
4. Name of Railroad Responsible for Track Maintenance: CSX Transportation [CSX]			4a. Alphabetic Code CSX			4b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. 000044919		
5. U.S. DOT_AAR Grade Crossing Identification Number			6. Date of Accident/Incident Month 04 Day 01 Year 2008			7. Time of Accident/Incident 03:22:00 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AM <input type="checkbox"/> PM		
8. Type of Accident/Incident (single entry in code box)			1. Derailment 2. Head on collision 3. Rear end collision			4. Side collision 5. Raking collision 6. Broken Train collision		
			7. Hwy-rail crossing 8. RR grade crossing 9. Obstruction			10. Explosion-detonation 11. Fire/violent rupture 12. Other impacts		
			13. Other (describe in narrative)			13		
9. Cars Carrying HAZMAT 0		10. HAZMAT Cars Damaged/Derailed N/A		11. Cars Releasing HAZMAT N/A		12. People Evacuated 0		13. Division CHICAGO
14. Nearest City/Town WALBRIDGE			15. Milepost (to nearest tenth) QT5		16. State Abbr Code N/A OH		17. County WOOD	
18. Temperature (F) (specify if minus) 34 F		19. Visibility (single entry) 1. Dawn 3. Dusk 2. Day 4. Dark Code 4		20. Weather (single entry) 1. Clear 3. Rain 5. Sleet 2. Cloudy 4. Fog 6. Snow Code 3			21. Type of Track 1. Main 3. Siding 2. Yard 4. Industry Code 2	
22. Track Name/Number BO 5			23. FRA Track Class (1-9, X) Code 1		24. Annual Track Density (gross tons in millions) N/A		25. Time Table Direction 1. North 3. East 2. South 4. West Code 1	
OPERATING TRAIN #1								
26. Type of Equipment Consist (single entry)			1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train			4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars		
			7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s) 9. Maint./inspect.car			A. Spec. MoW Equip. Code 7		27. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No 1
28. Train Number/Symbol Y39131			29. Speed (recorded speed, if available) R - Recorded E - Estimated 0 MPH R			30. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, excluding power units) N/A		
			31. Method(s) of Operation (enter code(s) that apply) a. ATCS b. Auto train control c. Auto train stop d. Cab e. Traffic f. Interlocking			g. Automatic block h. Current of traffic i. Time table/train orders j. Track warrant control k. Direct traffic control l. Yard limits		
			m. Special instructions n. Other than main track o. Positive train control p. Other (Specify in narrative) Code(s) n N/A N/A N/A N/A			31a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive? 0 = Not a remotely controlled 1 = Remote control portable 2 = Remote control tower 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter 1		
32. Principal Car/Unit		a. Initial and Number		b. Position in Train		c. Loaded (yes/no)		33. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.
(1) First involved (derailed, struck, etc)		0		0		N/A		Alcohol N/A
(2) Causing (if mechanical cause reported)		0		0		N/A		Drugs N/A
								34. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N) N/A
35. Locomotive Units		a. Head End		Mid Train		Rear End		36. Cars
		b. Manual		c. Remote		d. Manual c. Remote		a. Freight b. Pass. c. Freight d. Pass. e. Caboose
(1) Total in Train		2		0 0		0 0		(1) Total in Equipment Consist 0 0 0 0 0
(2) Total Derailed		0		0 0		0 0		(2) Total Derailed 0 0 0 0 0
37. Equipment Damage		This Consist		38. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage		\$0.00 \$0.00		39. Primary Cause Code H201
		\$0.00						40. Contributing Cause Code N/A
Number of Crew Members				Length of Time on Duty				
41. Engineer/Operators 1		42. Firemen 0		43. Conductors 1		44. Brakemen 0		45. Engineer/Operator Hrs 4 Mi 52
								46. Conductor Hrs 4 Mi 52
Casualties to:		47. Railroad Employees		48. Train Passengers		49. Other		50. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No 2
Fatal		0		0		0		51. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes 2. No 2
Nonfatal		1		0		0		52. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No 2
OPERATING TRAIN #2								
53. Type of Equipment Consist (single entry)			1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train			4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars		
			7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s) 9. Maint./inspect.car			A. Spec. MoW Equip. Code 5		54. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No 2
55. Train Number/Symbol N/A			56. Speed (recorded speed, if available) R - Recorded E - Estimated 2 MPH E			57. Method(s) of Operation (enter code(s) that apply) a. ATCS b. Auto train control c. Auto train stop d. Cab e. Traffic f. Interlocking		
			g. Automatic block h. Current of traffic i. Time table/train orders j. Track warrant control k. Direct traffic control l. Yard limits			m. Special instructions n. Other than main track Code(s) n N/A N/A N/A N/A		
			58a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive? 0 = Not a remotely controlled 1 = Remote control portable			1		

57. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, excluding power units)	5	c. Auto train stop d. Cab e. Traffic f. Interlocking	i. Time table/train orders j. Track warrant control k. Direct traffic control l. Yard limits	o. Positive train control p. Other (Specify in narrative) Code(s)	2 = Remote control tower 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter
				n N/A N/A N/A N/A	0

59. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded(yes/no)	60. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.	Alcohol	Drugs
(1) First involved (derailed, struck, etc)	NYC587813	0	yes		N/A	N/A
(2) Causing (if mechanical cause reported)	0	0	N/A	61. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N)		N

62. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual c. Remote	63. Cars	Loaded a. Freight b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Train	0	0 0	0 0	(1) Total in Equipment Consist	1 0	0 0	0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0 0	0 0	(2) Total Derailed	0 0	0 0	0

64. Equipment Damage This Consist	\$0.00	65. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage	\$0.00	66. Primary Cause Code	H201	67. Contributing Cause Code	N/A
Number of Crew Members				Length of Time on Duty			

68. Engineer/Operators	0	69. Firemen	0	70. Conductors	0	71. Brakemen	0	72. Engineer/Operator	Hrs 0 Mi 0	73. Conductor	Hrs 0 Mi 0
------------------------	---	-------------	---	----------------	---	--------------	---	-----------------------	------------	---------------	------------

Casualties to:	74. Railroad Employees	75. Train Passengers	76. Other	77. EOT Device?	1. Yes 2. No	2	78. Was EOT Device Properly Armed?	1. Yes 2. No	2
Fatal	0	0	0	79. Caboose Occupied by Crew?	1. Yes 2. No	2			
Nonfatal	0	0	0						

OPERATING TRAIN #3

80. Type of Equipment Consist (single entry)	1. Freight train	4. Work train	7. Yard/switching	A. Spec. MoW Equip.	Code	81. Was Equipment Attended?	Code	82. Train Number/Symbol
	2. Passenger train	5. Single car	8. Light loco(s).		N/A	1. Yes 2. No	N/A	N/A
	3. Commuter train	6. Cut of cars	9. Maint./inspect.car					

83. Speed (recorded speed, if available)	Code	85. Method(s) of Operation (enter code(s) that apply)	85a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
R - Recorded		a. ATCS g. Automatic block m.Special instructions	0 = Not a remotely controlled
E - Estimated	N/A MPH N/A	b. Auto train control h. Current of traffic n. Other than main track	1 = Remote control portable
84. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, excluding power units)	N/A	c. Auto train stop i. Time table/train orders o. Positive train control	2 = Remote control tower
		d. Cab j. Track warrant control p. Other (Specify in narrative)	3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter
		e. Traffic k. Direct traffic control	
		f. Interlocking l. Yard limits	
			N/A

86. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded(yes/no)	87. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.	Alcohol	Drugs
(1) First involved (derailed, struck, etc)	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A
(2) Causing (if mechanical cause reported)	N/A	N/A	N/A	88. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N)		N/A

89. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual c. Remote	90. Cars	Loaded a. Freight b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Train	N/A	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	(1) Total in Equipment Consist	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	N/A
(2) Total Derailed	N/A	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	(2) Total Derailed	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	N/A

91. Equipment Damage This Consist	N/A	92. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage	N/A	93. Primary Cause Code	N/A	94. Contributing Cause Code	N/A
Number of Crew Members				Length of Time on Duty			


95. Engineer/Operators	N/A	96. Firemen	N/A	97. Conductors	N/A	98. Brakemen	N/A	99. Engineer/Operator	Hrs N/A Mi N/A	100. Conductor	Hrs N/A Mi N/A
------------------------	-----	-------------	-----	----------------	-----	--------------	-----	-----------------------	----------------	----------------	----------------

Casualties to:	101. Railroad Employees	102. Train	103. Other	104. EOT	1. Yes 2. No	N/A	105. Was EOT Device Properly	1. Yes 2. No	N/A
Fatal	N/A	N/A	N/A	106. Caboose Occupied by Crew?	1. Yes 2. No				
Nonfatal	N/A	N/A	N/A						

Highway User Involved				Rail Equipment Involved			
107. C. Truck-Trailer. F. Bus J. Other Motor Vehicle Code	A. Auto D. Pick-Up Truck G. School Bus K. Pedestrian	B. Truck E. Van H. Motorcycle M. Other (spec. in narrative)	N/A	111. Equipment	3. Train (standing)	6. Light Loco(s) (moving)	Code
108. Vehicle Speed (est. MPH at impact)	N/A	109. geographical Code	N/A	1. Train(units pulling)	4. Car(s) (moving)	7. Light(s) (standing)	N/A
		1. North 2. South 3. East 4. West	N/A	2. Train(units pushing)	5. Car(s) (standing)	8. Other (specify in narrative)	
				112. Position of Car Unit in	N/A		

110. Position 1. Stalled on Crossing 2. Stopped on Crossing 3. Moving Over Crossing 4. Trapped				Code N/A	113. Circumstance 1. Rail Equipment Struck Highway User 2. Rail Equipment Struck by Highway User				Code N/A		
114a. Was the highway user and/or rail equipment involved in the impact transporting hazardous materials? 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither				Code N/A	114b. Was there a hazardous materials release 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither				Code N/A		
114c. State here the name and quantity of the hazardous materials released, if any. N/A											
115. Type Crossing 1. Gates 2. Cantilever FLS 3. Standard FLS 4. Trapped Warning 5. Hwy. traffic signals 6. Audible				Code N/A	116. Signaled Crossing (See instructions for codes)				Code N/A	117. Whistle Ban 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	
Code(s)				N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
118. Location of Warning 1. Both Sides 2. Side of Vehicle Approach 3. Opposite Side of Vehicle Approach				Code N/A	119. Crossing Warning with Highway Signals 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown				Code N/A	120. Crossing Illuminated by Street Lights or Special Lights 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	
121. Age N/A		122. Driver's Gender 1. Male 2. Female		Code N/A	123. Driver Drove Behind or in Front of and Struck or was Struck by Second Train 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown				Code N/A	124. Driver 1. Drove around or thru the Gate 2. Stopped and then Proceeded 3. Did not Stop	
125. Driver Passed Highway Vehicle 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown				Code N/A	126. View of Track Obscured by (primary obstruction) 1. Permanent Structure 2. Standing Railroad Equipment 3. Passing Train 4. Topography 5. Vegetation 6. Highway Vehicle 7. Other (specify in narrative) 8. Not obstructed				Code N/A		
Casualties to:			Killed	Injured	127. Driver 1. Killed 2. Injured 3. Uninjured				Code N/A	128. Was Driver in the Vehicle? 1. Yes 2. No	
129. Highway-Rail Crossing Users			N/A	N/A	130. Highway Vehicle Property Damage (est. dollar damage)				N/A	131. Total Number of Highway-Rail Crossing Users (include driver)	
132. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights? 1. Yes 2. No				Code N/A	133. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights Operational? 1. Yes 2. No				Code N/A		
134. Locomotive Headlight Illuminated? 1. Yes 2. No				Code N/A	135. Locomotive Audible Warning Sounded? 1. Yes 2. No				Code N/A		

136. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.



137. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

At 3:22 a.m. on 4/1/08 a CSX Remote Control Operator (RCO) was struck by a free rolling car at the north end of the Stanely Hump Bowl Yard, Walbridge, OH. The two man crew on assignment Y391-31 was in the process of pulling cars from Bowl Track # 4 when a free rolling car on Track # 5 hit the RCO directing the move on Track # 4.

The RCO sustained injuries including head lacerations, a punctured lung and a severe injury to his left arm. After being transported to the University of Toledo Medical Center, he underwent surgery which resulted in the amputation of his left arm at the shoulder socket.

At the time of the accident, it was dark, rainy, and windy.

The accident was caused by the failure of the RCO to obtain blocking protection on the adjacent track to the one he was working as prescribed by CSX Time Table Instructions.

138. NARRATIVE

CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

At 10:30 p.m. EST on March 31, 2008 the crew on Yard Job Y391-31 went on duty at CSX Stanley Yard. The crew consisted of two Remote Control Operators (Foreman and Switchman). This is the home terminal for both employees and they had received the required statutory off duty rest period prior to reporting for duty. The Bowl Yard and Departure Yard tracks are oriented North and South. The hump for the Bowl is at the south end of the Bowl Yard. The yard crews pull cars out of the Bowl from the north end of the yard. These cars are assembled into trains and placed on Departure Tracks for inspection by the car mechanics and prepared for departure.

After reporting for duty, the crew received a job briefing from the Stanley Yardmaster. Once the job briefing was completed the crew commenced work. As a puller crew, their equipment consisted of one conventional locomotive and a Remote Control Locomotive (RCL). Each employee was equipped with a Remote Control Unit (RCU) which attaches to a vest worn by each RCO. Their first move of the night involved the movement of cars from Bowl Tracks # 7 and # 8 to Departure Yard Track # 2. The crew then pulled cars from Bowl Tracks # 5 and # 6 and placed them in Departure Track # 1. During these moves the crew had obtained Blocking Protection on the tracks they were working on and an adjacent track. This procedure follows the Toledo Terminal Time Table Instructions. During these moves the Remote Control Unit (RCU) belonging to the RCO Foreman malfunctioned. The crew members had another job briefing and decided the Foreman would direct the moves using his radio and the switchman would control the movement with his control unit.

After pulling cars from the Bowl Track # 5 and #6 the Yardmaster asked the crew to give up their blocking protection on Tracks # 3 and # 6. The Yardmaster also instructed the crew to pull cars from the Bowl Track # 4 next. This was a change in the original plan of pulling cars from Bowl tracks # 19 and # 20. The Crew Foreman contacted the Car Retarder Operator (CRO) via radio and requested the blocking protection be removed from Track # 5 and # 6. During this same conversation the crew established blocking protection on Bowl Track # 4. This occurred at approximately 3:11 a.m. as shown on the RCO Blue Signal Blocking Protection Record. The RCO and puller crew work on different radio channels. The RCO Foreman

requested the change in track protection using the CRO channel. The RCO Switchman did not hear this conversation.

After placing cars from Bowl Track #5 and # 6 in Departure Track # 1, the crew proceeded to couple their locomotives to cars at the north end of Bowl Track # 4. When the crew made this move with their locomotives the Switchman was on the west side leading into Track # 4 and remained there until the coupling was made. The RCO Foreman was on the west side of Track # 4 as he directed the move to the coupling. After coupling to the cars, the switchman boarded the lead locomotive and sat in the conductor's seat, west side of the locomotive, where he would remain while making the next few moves. The switchman stated that there were no cars in Track # 5 at the time he made the coupling to the cars in Bowl Track # 4.

After coupling to the cars, the Foreman instructed the Switchman over the radio to stretch the cars. He then instructed the Switchman to stop the move. At this time the train was coupled to 14 cars at the north end of the track. The Foreman was between tracks #4 and #5 and about 10 cars lengths from the north end of the track. The next transmission from the Foreman was that he had been hit by a railcar. The Switchman stated that he dismounted the locomotive and went to look for the Foreman. He stated he went south along the west side of # 4 Track and noticed one car was now located at the north end of Track # 5.

The Bowl is composed of 42 tracks. They are tangent at the north end of the Yard. The track center between Track # 4 and Track # 5 at the location of the accident is 12 feet 7 inches. The distance between two cars standing on the tracks side by side is about 30 inches. The Hump Yard operation is controlled by three Car Retarded Operators. These operators are located in three separate towers at the south end of the Hump Yard. The Car Retarders manually apply retarding pressure to the rail car wheels to control the speed of the cars entering the Bowl. Inert Retarders and car skates are located at the north end of each of the Bowl Tracks.

THE ACCIDENT

As the RCO Foreman was standing between Bowl Tracks # 4 and #5, he was struck by a free rolling car (NYC587813). This car was humped into Bowl Track # 5 after the crew on Y131-31 released blocking protection on the track. The Foreman was knocked to the ground between Tracks # 4 and # 5 and appeared to have been dragged a short distance by the car. The Switchman dismounted the lead locomotive after hearing the Foreman on the radio saying "Help Jim my arm". The Switchman walked south and discovered the Foreman lying between Tracks # 4 and # 5 with his head toward the north and his feet pointing south. The Foreman's face was oriented toward the east rail of Track # 5. The Foreman's entire body was outside the gauge of the track. The Yardmaster arrived at the scene of the accident and then returned to his office to call the Trainmaster and emergency medical services. Emergency medical personnel arrived at the scene at about 3:36 a.m. and transported the Foreman to Owens Community College at about 4:25 a.m. He was loaded on the life-flight helicopter at approximately 4:34 a.m. and transported to the Toledo Medical Center. The Foreman suffered lacerations to his head, a punctured left lung and a severely severed left arm. During surgery the left arm was amputated at the left shoulder socket. Estimated speed of the free rolling car was 1-4 mph.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

-THE TRACKS:

An inspection of the track structure was conducted by an FRA Track Inspector. The inspection revealed that the rail on Track # 5 Continuous Welded Rail (CWR) and the track is tangent. Track centers between Track # 4 and # 5 are 12 feet and seven inches. There were no exceptions noted in the cross level in Track # 5.

CONCLUSION:

The close clearance of the tracks in the Bowl Yard was a concern of the railroad and instructions concerning the manner in which employees were to protect themselves were published in the railroad's Time Table Special Instructions.

-THE CAR:

Rail car NYC 587813, a gondola loaded with scrap metal, was inspected by an FRA Motive Power and Equipment Inspector. He noted two exceptions in his inspection: 1) the ladder top tread on the L1 corner had insufficient clearance 2) the R1 sill step was bent inward.

CONCLUSION:

The defects noted during the inspection of the car were deemed not to have any bearing on the accident.

-THE OPERATION HUMP CRO RECORDS:

The Blue Signal Blocking Protection Record from Tower B reflects protection was requested by the RCO and placed on Tracks # 5 and # 6 by the CRO at 1:27 a.m. The protection was removed by request of the RCO at 3:11 a.m. The RCO then requested protection be placed on Tracks # 4 at 3:11 a.m. The CRO placed Blocking Protection on Track # 4 as requested.

CONCLUSION:

The RCO failed to establish protection as required by Time Table Instructions.

-RADIO RECORDING OF CSX Y391-31 CREW:

The time line of the radio transmissions shows that the Y391-31 crew coupled to the cars in Track # 4 at about 3:20 a.m. The Foreman reported to his switchman that "he is in the clear and to stretch the cars". He then instructed the switchman to "stop the move" "that will do". The switchman complied with these instructions. At 3:21 and 40 seconds, a radio transmission was attempted but no voice was heard. Then at 3:22 and 15 seconds the RCO Foreman exclaimed over the radio "Help Jimmy my arm" "Jimmy my arm".

CONCLUSION:

The radio record sets the time the injury occurred at 3:22 a.m.

-TIMETABLE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

The Chicago Division Timetable # 2, effective Tuesday, April 1, 2008 at 0001 hours CSX Standard time under the Toledo Terminal Subdivision Special Instructions, 8 Miscellaneous, Stanley Yard, Paragraph 5 states "Spike protection while working on tracks: when working on tracks in the Bowl at Stanley Yard, Spike Protection must be received on both the track you are working on as well as the adjacent track". Spike Protection means Blocking Protection.

CONCLUSION:

The railroad knew the dangers of the close clearance situation in the Bowl Yard and published instructions for employees to follow to protect themselves. The railroad has instructions published in their Time Table Special Instructions requiring employees to have Blue Signal Blocking Protection on the track they are working on and the adjacent track in the Stanley Yard Bowl. During interviews with CSX employees, it was evident that the employees know the requirements but some crews do not always follow the instructions.

-EMPLOYEE TRAINING:

Training records reveal the injured employee received proper training.

-TOXICOLOGY TESTS WERE NOT PERFORMED ON ANY CSX EMPLOYEE.

CONCLUSION: NONE.

FRA PROBABLE CAUSE & CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:

Contributing factors to this injury include the failure of the CRO Yardmaster and the Remote Control Crew to conduct adequate Job Briefings regarding their decision to pull cars from Track # 4 versus Tracks #19 and #

20 and the lack of Blue Signal Protection of the Remote Control Crew. The CRO had an opportunity to inform the crew when they requested protection on Track # 4, that Track # 5 was being used and cars were being humped into that track. The crew failed to communicate to each other regarding the protection they had when they entered Track # 4.

The FRA investigation determined the Probable Cause of the injury was the failure of the injured employee to establish Blue Flag Blocking Protection as required by CSX Time Table Special Instructions.