DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT

FRA File # **HQ-2008-56**

1.Name of Railroad Operating Train #1 **Indiana Harbor Belt RR Co. [IHB]**	1a. Alphabetic Code **IHB**	1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. **3814**
2.Name of Railroad Operating Train #2 **Indiana Harbor Belt RR Co. [IHB]**	2a. Alphabetic Code **IHB**	2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. **3887**
3.Name of Railroad Operating Train #3 **N/A**	3a. Alphabetic Code **N/A**	3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. **N/A**
4.Name of Railroad Responsible for Track Maintenance: **Indiana Harbor Belt RR Co. [IHB]**	4a. Alphabetic Code **IHB**	4b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. **3814**
5. U.S. DOT_AAR Grade Crossing Identification Number	6. Date of Accident/Incident Month **06** Day **15** Year **2008**	7. Time of Accident/Incident **07:55:00** ☑ **AM** ☐ **PM**

8. Type of Accident/Indicent *(single entry in code box)*: 1. Derailment; 2. Head on collision; 3. Rear end collision; 4. Side collision; 5. Raking collision; 6. Broken Train collision; 7. Hwy-rail crossing; 8. RR grade crossing; 9. Obstruction; 10. Explosion-detonation; 11. Fire/violent rupture; 12. Other impacts; 13. Other *(describe in narrative)* — Code: **03**

9. Cars Carrying HAZMAT	10. HAZMAT Cars Damaged/Derailed	11. Cars Releasing HAZMAT	12. People Evacuated	13. Division
13	**00**	**00**	**0**	**SYSTEM**

14. Nearest City/Town	15. Milepost *(to nearest tenth)*	16. State Abbr	16. State Code	17. County
DOLTON	**9.1**	**N/A**	**IL**	**COOK**

18. Temperature (F) *(specify if minus)*	19. Visibility *(single entry)* 1. Dawn 2. Day 3.Dusk 4.Dark — Code	20. Weather (single entry) 1. Clear 2. Cloudy 3. Rain 4. Fog 5.Sleet 6.Snow — Code	21. Type of Track 1. Main 2. Yard 3. Siding 4. Industry — Code
80 F	**2**	**2**	**1**

22. Track Name/Number	23. FRA Track Class (1-9, X) — Code	24. Annual Track Density *(gross tons in millions)*	25. Time Table Direction 1. North 2. South 3. East 4. West — Code
IHB MAIN TRACK 2	**1**	**64.9**	**3**

OPERATING TRAIN #1

26. Type of Equipment Consist *(single entry)* 1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train 4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars 7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s). 9. Maint./inspect.car A. Spec. MoW Equip. — Code	27. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No — Code	28. Train Number/Symbol
1	**1**	**KB54-BA4**

29. Speed *(recorded speed, if available)* R - Recorded E - Estimated — Code	31. Method(s) of Operation *(enter code(s) that apply)*	31a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
9 MPH **R**	a. ATCS; b. Auto train control; c. Auto train stop; d. Cab; e. Traffic; f. Interlocking; g. Automatic block; h. Current of traffic; i. Time table/train orders; j.Track warrant control; k. Direct traffic control; l.Yard limits; m.Special instructions; n. Other than main track; o. Positive train control; p. Other *(Specify in narrative)*	0 = Not a remotely controlled; 1 = Remote control portable; 2 = Remote control tower; 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter
30. Trailing Tons *(gross tonnage, excluding power units)*: **4929**	Code(s): **e** **N/A** **N/A** **N/A** **N/A**	**0**

32. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded *(yes/no)*
(1) First involved *(derailed, struck, etc)*	**IHB 4013**	**1**	**N/A**
(2) Causing *(if mechanical cause reported)*	**0**	**0**	**N/A**

33. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.

Alcohol	Drugs
0	**0**

34. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N) **N**

35. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual	Mid Train c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual	Rear End c. Remote
(1) Total in Train	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
(2) Total Derailed	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

36. Cars	Loaded a. Freight	Loaded b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight	Empty d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Equipment Consist	**34**	**0**	**23**	**0**	**0**
(2) Total Derailed	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

37. Equipment Damage This Consist	38. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage	39. Primary Cause Code	40. Contributing Cause Code
$0.00	**$1,806.00**	**H605**	**N/A**

Number of Crew Members

41. Engineer/ Operators	42. Firemen	43. Conductors	44. Brakemen
1	**0**	**1**	**0**

Length of Time on Duty

45. Engineer/Operator	46. Conductor
Hrs **3** Mi **25**	Hrs **3** Mi **25**

Casualties to:	47. Railroad Employees	48. Train Passengers	49. Other
Fatal	**0**	**0**	**0**
Nonfatal	**0**	**0**	**0**

50. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No	51. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes 2. No
1	**1**

52. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No — **2**

OPERATING TRAIN #2

53. Type of Equipment Consist *(single entry)* 1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train 4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars 7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s). 9. Maint./inspect.car A. Spec. MoW Equip. — Code	54. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No — Code	55. Train Number/Symbol
1	**1**	**NP 10**

56. Speed *(recorded speed, if available)* R - Recorded E - Estimated — Code	58. Method(s) of Operation *(enter code(s) that apply)*	58a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
0 MPH **R**	a. ATCS; b. Auto train control; g. Automatic block; h. Current of traffic; m.Special instructions; n. Other than main track	0 = Not a remotely controlled; 1 = Remote control portable

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57. Trailing Tons *(gross tonnage, excluding power units)*	c. Auto train stop d. Cab e. Traffic f. Interlocking	i. Time table/train orders j.Track warrant control k. Direct traffic control l.Yard limits	o. Positive train control p. Other *(Specify in narrative)* Code(s)	2 = Remote control tower 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter
3839			**e** **N/A** **N/A** **N/A** **N/A**	**0**

59. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded *(yes/no)*	60. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.	Alcohol	Drugs
(1) First involved *(derailed, struck, etc)*	**TTGX978342**	**54**	**yes**		**N/A**	**N/A**
(2) Causing *(if mechanical cause reported)*	**0**	**0**	**N/A**	61. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N)		**N**

62. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual	Mid Train c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual	Rear End c. Remote	63. Cars	Loaded a. Freight	Loaded b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight	Empty d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Train	**2**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	(1) Total in Equipment Consist	**52**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
(2) Total Derailed	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	(2) Total Derailed	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**

64. Equipment Damage This Consist	65. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage	66. Primary Cause Code	67. Contributing Cause Code
$40.00	**$1,806.00**	**H605**	**N/A**

Number of Crew Members: 68. Engineer/ Operators	69. Firemen	70. Conductors	71. Brakemen	Length of Time on Duty: 72. Engineer/Operator	73. Conductor
1	**0**	**1**	**0**	Hrs **9** Mi **55**	Hrs **9** Mi **55**

Casualties to:	74. Railroad Employees	75. Train Passengers	76. Other	77. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No	78. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes 2. No
Fatal	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**
Nonfatal	**2**	**0**	**0**	79. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No	**2**

OPERATING TRAIN #3

80. Type of Equipment Consist *(single entry)*	81. Was Equipment Attended?	Code	82. Train Number/Symbol
1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train 4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars 7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s). 9. Maint./inspect.car A. Spec. MoW Equip.	1. Yes 2. No	**N/A**	**N/A**
N/A	**N/A**		

83. Speed *(recorded speed, if available)*	Code	85. Method(s) of Operation *(enter code(s) that apply)*	85a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
R - Recorded E - Estimated **N/A** MPH	**N/A**	a. ATCS b. Auto train control c. Auto train stop d. Cab e. Traffic f. Interlocking g. Automatic block h. Current of traffic i. Time table/train orders j.Track warrant control k. Direct traffic control l.Yard limits m.Special instructions n. Other than main track o. Positive train control p. Other *(Specify in narrative)* Code(s) **N/A** **N/A** **N/A** **N/A** **N/A**	0 = Not a remotely controlled 1 = Remote control portable 2 = Remote control tower 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter **N/A**
84. Trailing Tons *(gross tonnage, excluding power units)* **N/A**			

86. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded *(yes/no)*	87. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.	Alcohol	Drugs
(1) First involved *(derailed, struck, etc)*	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**		**N/A**	**N/A**
(2) Causing *(if mechanical cause reported)*	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	88. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N)		**N/A**

89. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual	Mid Train c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual	Rear End c. Remote	90. Cars	Loaded a. Freight	Loaded b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight	Empty d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Train	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	(1) Total in Equipment Consist	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**
(2) Total Derailed	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	(2) Total Derailed	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**

91. Equipment Damage This Consist	92. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage	93. Primary Cause Code	94. Contributing Cause Code
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Number of Crew Members: 95. Engineer/ Operators	96. Firemen	97. Conductors	98. Brakemen	Length of Time on Duty: 99. Engineer/Operator	100. Conductor
N/A	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	Hrs **N/A** Mi **N/A**	Hrs **N/A** Mi **N/A**

Casualties to:	101. Railroad Employees	102. Train	103. Other	104. EOT 1. Yes 2. No	105. Was EOT Device Properly 1. Yes 2. No
Fatal	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**
Nonfatal	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	106. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No	**N/A**

Highway User Involved

107.	Code
A. Auto B. Truck C. Truck-Trailer. D. Pick-Up Truck E. Van F. Bus G. School Bus H. Motorcycle J. Other Motor Vehicle K. Pedestrian M. Other *(spec. in narrative)*	**N/A**

108. Vehicle Speed *(est. MPH at impact)*	109. *geographical)* 1.North 2.South 3.East 4.West	Code
N/A		**N/A**

Rail Equipment Involved

111. Equipment	Code
1.Train *(units pulling)* 2.Train *(units pushing)* 3.Train *(standing)* 4.Car(s) *(moving)* 5.Car(s) *(standing)* 6.Light Loco(s) *(moving)* 7.Light(s) *(standing)* 8.Other *(specify in narrative)*	**N/A**

112. Position of Car Unit in
N/A

110. Position	Code	113. Circumstance	Code
1.Stalled on Crossing 2.Stopped on Crossing 3.Moving Over Crossing 4. Trapped	**N/A**	1. Rail Equipment Struck Highway User 2. Rail Equipment Struck by Highway User	**N/A**
114a. Was the highway user and/or rail equipment involved in the impact transporting hazardous materials? 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither	**N/A**	114b. Was there a hazardous materials release 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither	**N/A**

114c. State here the name and quantity of the hazardous materials released, if any.

N/A

115. Type Crossing Warning	1.Gates	4.Wig Wags	7.Crossbucks	10.Flagged by crew	116. Signaled Crossing *(See instructions for codes)*	Code	117. Whistle Ban 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	Code
	2.Cantilever FLS	5.Hwy. traffic signals	8.Stop signs	11.Other *(spec. in narr.)*				
	3.Standard FLS	6.Audible	9.Watchman	12.None				
Code(s)	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**	**N/A**

118. Location of Warning 1. Both Sides 2. Side of Vehicle Approach 3. Opposite Side of Vehicle Approach	Code	119. Crossing Warning with Highway Signals 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	Code	120. Crossing Illuminated by Street Lights or Special Lights 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	Code
	N/A		**N/A**		**N/A**

121. Age	122. Driver's Gender 1. Male 2. Female	Code	123. Driver Drove Behind or in Front of and Struck or was Struck by Second Train 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	Code	124. Driver 1. Drove around or thru the Gate 2. Stopped and then Proceeded 3. Did not Stop 4. Stopped on Crossing 5. Other *(specify in narrative)*	Code
N/A		**N/A**		**N/A**		**N/A**

125. Driver Passed Highway Vehicle 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	Code	126. View of Track Obscured by *(primary obstruction)* 1. Permanent Structure 2. Standing Railroad Equipment 3. Passing Train 4. Topography 5. Vegetation 6. Highway Vehicle 7. Other *(specify in narrative)* 8. Not obstructed	Code
	N/A		**N/A**

Casualties to:	Killed	Injured	127. Driver 1. Killed 2.Injured 3. Uninjured	Code	128. Was Driver in the Vehicle? 1. Yes 2. No	Code
				N/A		**N/A**
129. Highway-Rail Crossing Users	**N/A**	**N/A**	130. Highway Vehicle Property Damage *(est. dollar damage)*	**N/A**	131. Total Number of Highway-Rail Crossing Users *(include driver)*	N/A

132. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights? 1. Yes 2. No	Code	133. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights Operational? 1. Yes 2. No	Code
	N/A		**N/A**
134. Locomotive Headlight Illuminated? 1. Yes 2. No	Code	135. Locomotive Audible Warning Sounded? 1. Yes 2. No	Code
	N/A		**N/A**

136. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.



137. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

Eastbound Indiana Harbor Belt (IHB) Freight Train KB54-BA-4 (BA-4) collided with the rear end of stopped IHB Freight Train NP-10 (NP-10) on June 15, 2008, at 7:55 a.m. CDT. The accident occurred in Dolton, Illinois, at IHB Milepost 9.1 on Main Track 2. There were no injuries to the crew of IHB train BA-4. Both crewmembers on IHB Train NP-10 sustained reportable non-life threatening injuries. No equipment derailed as a result of the collision. There was no damage to the locomotive of IHB Train BA-4. The rear end of IHB Train NP-10 had minor damage of $40. There was $1,806 in track damage.

At the time of the accident it was daylight, overcast, and windy. The temperature was 80 ºF.

The accident was caused by the failure of the crew of IHB Train BA-4's to comply with the requirements of a restricting signal indication. The crew did not operate their train at a speed that would allow them to stop within one half the range of vision short of a train occupying the track ahead. The conductor's fatigue may have been a contributing factor.

138. NARRATIVE

CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

IHB TRAIN BA-4

The two man crew of IHB train BA-4 consisted of a locomotive engineer and a conductor. They went on duty at 4:30 a.m., on June 15, 2008, at IHB's Blue Island Yard Office, in Blue Island, Illinois. This is the home terminal for both crew members. They both worked 12 hours during their previous tour of duty, and both received more than the required statutory off duty period of 10 hours, prior to reporting for duty.

The assigned freight train consisted of one locomotive, 57 rail cars (34 loaded rail cars and 23 empty cars) of several varieties. It was 3,241 feet long and weighed 4,929 tons. The train was to be taken from Blue Island Yard to Burnham Yard with cars to be set out at one location en route.

The crew received their paperwork, and instructions from the yardmaster about the location of their train. The crew held a job briefing prior to leaving the yard office discussing the work they were to perform. Following the job briefing the crew attached the locomotive to their train and received a Class 1 air brake test from a mechanical department employee. They departed Blue Island Yard at approximately 7:25 a.m.

The crew entered Main Track 2 at School Street, milepost 11.3 and proceeded east. They observed an approach signal at Dolton Junction, milepost 10.5, allowing them to operate east on Main Track 2. The crew could see that the signal at CP Grove, milepost 9.7, was a red signal displaying a stop indication. As the engineer prepared to stop for the signal, the signal changed to a lunar aspect. The crew verbally acknowledged the restricting signal in the cab of the locomotive.

As the train approached the accident location, the locomotive engineer was seated at the controls on the north side of the locomotive. The conductor was seated on the south side of the locomotive. The locomotive was being operated long hood forward and this placed the conductor on the inside of the right hand curve.

The location of the accident was in the middle of a 4-degree 15 minute curve to the right. There is a 0.067 percent descending grade at this location. There was no restriction to the visibility of the conductor to the inside of the curve.

The railroad timetable direction of the train was east.

IHB TRAIN NP-10

The crew of IHB train NP-10 consisted of a locomotive engineer and a conductor. The crew went on duty at 10:00 p.m., June 14, 2008, at IHB's Norpaul Yard in Franklin Park, Illinois. This is the home terminal for both crew members. They both worked 12 hours during their previous tour of duty, and both received more than the required statutory off duty period of 10 hours, prior to reporting for duty.

The train consisted of two locomotives, 52 loaded auto rack rail cars, was 4,940 feet long and weighed 3,839 tons. The train was scheduled to go from Broadview, Illinois, to IHB's Gibson Yard in Hammond, Indiana, setting out cars at one location en route. The IHB received the train in interchange from the Union Pacific (UP) Railroad where it had already received a Class 1 air brake test.

The crew operated the train from Broadview to Blue Island Yard where they set out cars from the train. They departed Blue Island eastbound on Main Track 2 en route to Gibson Yard. The train crew observed an approach signal at Paxton Avenue, milepost 8.1 where they contacted the IHB East Dispatcher as required by IHB Timetable Rule 138-8. The dispatcher instructed the crew to stop short of Paxton Avenue until he was ready for them to continue east. The crew stopped their train short of signal 82 E. This is the standard procedure for trains in excess of 5,095 feet, because the train would not clear the Paxton Avenue Road Crossing if they pulled up to the next signal.

IHB train NP-10 was stopped at the time of the accident with the rear car in a 4-degree 15 minute right hand curve. The engineer was seated at the control stand on the south side of the leading locomotive. The conductor was seated in the seat on the north side of the locomotive.

THE ACCIDENT

IHB TRAIN BA-4:

Approaching the accident area, IHB train BA-4 was operating on a restricting signal indication at a speed of 15.7 mph. The locomotive engineer's view of the track ahead was obstructed by the long hood of the locomotive as the train entered the right hand curve. The engineer asked the conductor three times if he could see anything in front of them. The conductor answered him the third time and told him to stop; there was a train in front of them. IHB train BA-4's locomotive was approximately four car lengths from the rear car of IHB train NP-10 when the engineer took action to stop the train. The engineer induced an emergency application of the train air brake system by use of the automatic brake, and braced himself for impact. The train had slowed to 9.2 mph at the time of impact. The event recorder on IHB train BA-4's locomotive, IHB 4013, recorded the speed of 9 mph at the time of impact.

The maximum authorized speed for this section of track, per IHB Timetable #1, effective April 6, 2008, is 30 mph. IHB Daily Operating Bulletin number 6-15 dated 0600 Sunday, June 15, 2008, reduced the speed at the accident location to 10 mph.

After the collision, the engineer and conductor asked each other if they were injured, and neither one of them indicated that they were. The conductor transmitted "emergency, emergency, emergency" on the radio to inform the dispatcher of the collision. The dispatcher answered the radio transmission and the crew told him they had just collided with the train ahead.

The conductor inspected the locomotive and the rail car they struck to assess the damage. He determined nothing derailed and the damage to the equipment was minimal. He did notice an automobile in the rail car they struck had severely shifted and was partially protruding through the doors of the rail car. A more detailed inspection of the struck train revealed 27 rail cars contained shifted automobiles.

IHB TRAIN NP-10:

IHB Train NP-10 was stopped at the time of the accident. The lead locomotive of IHB Train NP-10 was on IHB Main Track No. 2, at milepost 8.2, and the rear end was at milepost 9.1. The crew was waiting for instructions from the dispatcher to proceed east.

The crew members were both seated at the time of the collision. They were talking to each other and felt the engine lunge forward, and heard the train air brakes go into an emergency application. They did not get knocked to the floor but were jostled around in their seats.

The crew transmitted an emergency broadcast over the radio which the dispatcher answered. The crew told the dispatcher they had been struck and they were requesting an ambulance.

An IHB police officer heard the emergency transmission over the radio and proceeded to the accident site. The IHB police officer spoke with the crew on IHB Train NP-10 to check on their condition. He then went to Paxton Avenue to direct the ambulance to the crew's location.

The ambulance took the crew to Saint Margaret Hospital in Hammond, IN where the engineer received treatment for soreness in his back. The conductor received treatment for soreness in his left arm and lower back.

The IHB dispatched trainmasters to the scene to assess the situation. The trainmasters asked the crew of IHB Train BA-4 what happened and the crew told them they had a restricting signal at CP Grove and they ran into the rear car of IHB Train NP-10. The trainmasters took the crew to IHB's Blue Island Yard Office to conduct an interview. The IHB conducted reasonable cause drug testing on the crew of IHB BA-4 under company authority. The trainmasters obtained written statements from the crew members and released them from duty at 12:30 p.m.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

ANALYSIS:

FRA obtained fatigue related information, for the 10-day period preceding this incident including the 10-day work history (on duty/off duty cycles) for all of the employees involved.

CONCLUSION:

Upon analysis of that information FRA concluded that one or more of the employees may have been working at a diminished level of safety (effectiveness) due to mental and/or physical attributes associated with fatigue, which may have contributed to the cause of the accident.

ANALYSIS - TOXICOLOGICAL TESTING:

The crew of IHB Train BA-4 was given a Reasonable Suspicion/Cause Drug Test under company authority. The results for both employees were negative.

CONCLUSION:

Intoxication was not a causal factor.

ANALYSIS - LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEER OPERATING PERFORMANCE:

The locomotive on IHB Train BA-4 was equipped with an event recorder. The data from the event recorder was downloaded and analyzed by the IHB Senior Road Foreman. The engineer was operating the locomotive backward, with the long hood of the locomotive obstructing his view as the train entered the right hand curve. The maximum authorized speed for the section of track is 30 mph. The crew of IHB Train BA-4 was operating over the maximum allowable for a restricted speed per IHB Daily Operating Bulletin No. 6-15.

CONCLUSION:

The locomotive engineer of IHB Train BA-4 did not operate in compliance with NORAC Rule 80 (Restricted Speed). The engineer was not operating at a speed that would allow him to stop short of a train occupying the track ahead. NORAC Rule 956 in part reads: "Engine service employees must regulate the speed of their train and exercise discretion, care, and vigilance in moving their train to avoid collisions." The engineer did not take sufficient measures to ascertain that the track was clear in front of him. The engineer should have operated into the curve at a slower speed if the crew was unable to determine the track in front of the train was clear of obstructions. The train crew of IHB BA-4 did not comply with the maximum speed for this section of track. The event recorder indicated the speed of the train had reached 15.7 mph. This was not in compliance with NORAC Rule 124, Maximum Authorized Speed.

ANALYSIS - CONDUCTOR PERFORMANCE:

The statements from IHB Train BA-4's crew indicated the conductor was in a position on the locomotive that should have allowed him to see the train in front of them.

CONCLUSION:

The conductor failed to inform the engineer of the train ahead of them until they were four to five car lengths from it. The conductor did not ensure the train was being operated in compliance with NORAC Rule 80. The conductor's statement and interview with the FRA indicated he closed his eyes after he called out the restricting signal to his engineer. The conductor did not remember anything from the time he called the signal to the time he heard the engineer loudly asking him if he could see anything ahead of them.

ANALYSIS - IHB NP-10 TRAIN CREW:

IHB Train NP-10 was stopped at Paxton Avenue at the time of the collision.

CONCLUSION:

The crew was in compliance with all railroad rules; and was not a contributing factor to the collision.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS:

The train crew of IHB Train BA-4 failed to comply with a signal requiring train movement at restricted speed. The train was not being operated at a speed that would allow it to stop in one-half the range of vision, short of a train occupying the track ahead. Operating the locomotive with the long hood forward created an operating condition requiring constant communication between the crew members in order to comply with the requirements of restricted speed. When the engineer was unable to see the track ahead was clear, and getting no response from the conductor, he should have immediately reduced the speed of the train, or stopped the train, until he could ascertain the track was clear of obstructions.

PROBABLE CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:

The accident was caused by the failure of IHB Train BA-4's crew to comply with the requirements of a restricting signal indication. The crew did not operate their train at a speed that would allow them to stop within one half the range of vision short of a train occupying the track ahead. The conductor's fatigue may have been a contributing factor.

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