Federal Railroad Administration
Office of Safety
Headquarters Assigned
Accident Investigation Report
HQ-2008-87

Union Pacific (UP)
Spring, TX
November 13, 2008

Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT

FRA File # HQ-2008-87

1.Name of Railroad Operating Train #1: Union Pacific RR Co. [UP]	1a. Alphabetic Code: UP	1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.: 1108HO021
2.Name of Railroad Operating Train #2: N/A	2a. Alphabetic Code: N/A	2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.: N/A
3.Name of Railroad Operating Train #3: N/A	3a. Alphabetic Code: N/A	3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.: N/A
4.Name of Railroad Responsible for Track Maintenance: Union Pacific RR Co. [UP]	4a. Alphabetic Code: UP	4b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.: 1108HO021
5. U.S. DOT_AAR Grade Crossing Identification Number:	6. Date of Accident/Incident: Month 11 | Day 13 | Year 2008	7. Time of Accident/Incident: 07:10:00 ☑ AM ☐ PM

8. Type of Accident/Indicent (single entry in code box)					Code
1. Derailment	4. Side collision	7. Hwy-rail crossing	10. Explosion-detonation	13. Other (describe in narrative)	12
2. Head on collision	5. Raking collision	8. RR grade crossing	11. Fire/violent rupture		
3. Rear end collision	6. Broken Train collision	9. Obstruction	12. Other impacts		

9. Cars Carrying HAZMAT	10. HAZMAT Cars Damaged/Derailed	11. Cars Releasing HAZMAT	12. People Evacuated	13. Division
0	0	0	0	Houston

14. Nearest City/Town	15. Milepost (to nearest tenth)	16. State Abbr	16. State Code	17. County
Spring	218.7	N/A	TX	HARRIS

18. Temperature (F) (specify if minus)	19. Visibility (single entry) 1. Dawn 2. Day 3.Dusk 4.Dark	Code	20. Weather (single entry) 1. Clear 2. Cloudy 3. Rain 4. Fog 5.Sleet 6.Snow	Code	21. Type of Track 1. Main 2. Yard 3. Siding 4. Industry	Code
60 F		1		4		1

22. Track Name/Number	23. FRA Track Class (1-9, X)	Code	24. Annual Track Density (gross tons in millions)	25. Time Table Direction 1. North 2. South 3. East 4. West	Code
main 1		4	25.2		2

OPERATING TRAIN #1

26. Type of Equipment Consist (single entry) 1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train 4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars 7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s). 9. Maint./inspect.car A. Spec. MoW Equip.	Code	27. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No	Code	28. Train Number/Symbol
	A	1. Yes	1	N/A

29. Speed (recorded speed, if available) R - Recorded E - Estimated	Code	30. Trailing Tons (gross tonnage, excluding power units)	31. Method(s) of Operation (enter code(s) that apply)	31a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
0 MPH	N/A	N/A	a. ATCS; b. Auto train control; c. Auto train stop; d. Cab; e. Traffic; f. Interlocking; g. Automatic block; h. Current of traffic; i. Time table/train orders; j.Track warrant control; k. Direct traffic control; l.Yard limits; m.Special instructions; n. Other than main track; o. Positive train control; p. Other (Specify in narrative) Code(s): g N/A N/A N/A N/A	0 = Not a remotely controlled; 1 = Remote control portable; 2 = Remote control tower; 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter: 0

32. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded (yes/no)
(1) First involved (derailed, struck, etc)	UP 61935	0	N/A
(2) Causing (if mechanical cause reported)	0	0	N/A

33. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.

Alcohol	Drugs
2	N/A

34. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N): N/A

35. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual	Mid Train c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual	Rear End c. Remote
(1) Total in Train	0	0	0	0	0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

36. Cars	Loaded a. Freight	Loaded b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight	Empty d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Equipment Consist	0	0	0	0	0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

37. Equipment Damage This Consist	38. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage	39. Primary Cause Code	40. Contributing Cause Code
$0.00	$0.00	H402	H212

Number of Crew Members: 41. Engineer/ Operators	42. Firemen	43. Conductors	44. Brakemen	Length of Time on Duty: 45. Engineer/Operator	46. Conductor
0	0	0	0	Hrs 0 Mi 0	Hrs 0 Mi 0

Casualties to:	47. Railroad Employees	48. Train Passengers	49. Other
Fatal	0	0	0
Nonfatal	0	0	0

50. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

51. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

52. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

OPERATING TRAIN #2

53. Type of Equipment Consist (single entry) 1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train 4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars 7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s). 9. Maint./inspect.car A. Spec. MoW Equip.	Code	54. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No	Code	55. Train Number/Symbol
	1	1. Yes	1	MHOSH-13

56. Speed (recorded speed, if available) R - Recorded E - Estimated	Code	58. Method(s) of Operation (enter code(s) that apply)	58a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
29 MPH	R	a. ATCS; b. Auto train control; g. Automatic block; h. Current of traffic; m.Special instructions; n. Other than main track	0 = Not a remotely controlled; 1 = Remote control portable

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57. Trailing Tons *(gross tonnage, excluding power units)*: 1678

c. Auto train stop; d. Cab; e. Traffic; f. Interlocking; i. Time table/train orders; j.Track warrant control; k. Direct traffic control; l.Yard limits; o. Positive train control; p. Other *(Specify in narrative)*

Code(s): e | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A

2 = Remote control tower
3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter: 0

59. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded *(yes/no)*
(1) First involved *(derailed, struck, etc)*	UP 9630	1	N/A
(2) Causing *(if mechanical cause reported)*	0	0	N/A

60. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.

Alcohol	Drugs
N/A	N/A

61. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N): N

62. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual	Mid Train c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual	Rear End c. Remote
(1) Total in Train	2	0	0	0	0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

63. Cars	Loaded a. Freight	Loaded b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight	Empty d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Equipment Consist	8	0	20	0	0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

64. Equipment Damage This Consist: $0.00

65. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage: $0.00

66. Primary Cause Code: N/A

67. Contributing Cause Code: N/A

Number of Crew Members

68. Engineer/ Operators	69. Firemen	70. Conductors	71. Brakemen
1	0	1	0

Length of Time on Duty

72. Engineer/Operator: Hrs 4 Mi 10

73. Conductor: Hrs 4 Mi 10

Casualties to:	74. Railroad Employees	75. Train Passengers	76. Other
Fatal	0	0	0
Nonfatal	0	0	0

77. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No: 1

78. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes 2. No: 1

79. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

OPERATING TRAIN #3

80. Type of Equipment Consist *(single entry)*: 1. Freight train; 2. Passenger train; 3. Commuter train; 4. Work train; 5. Single car; 6. Cut of cars; 7. Yard/switching; 8. Light loco(s); 9. Maint./inspect.car; A. Spec. MoW Equip. Code: N/A

81. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

82. Train Number/Symbol: N/A

83. Speed *(recorded speed, if available)* Code: R - Recorded; E - Estimated: N/A MPH: 0

84. Trailing Tons *(gross tonnage, excluding power units)*: N/A

85. Method(s) of Operation *(enter code(s) that apply)*

a. ATCS; b. Auto train control; c. Auto train stop; d. Cab; e. Traffic; f. Interlocking; g. Automatic block; h. Current of traffic; i. Time table/train orders; j.Track warrant control; k. Direct traffic control; l.Yard limits; m.Special instructions; n. Other than main track; o. Positive train control; p. Other *(Specify in narrative)*

Code(s): N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A

85a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
0 = Not a remotely controlled
1 = Remote control portable
2 = Remote control tower
3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter: N/A

86. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded *(yes/no)*
(1) First involved *(derailed, struck, etc)*	0	0	N/A
(2) Causing *(if mechanical cause reported)*	0	0	N/A

87. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.

Alcohol	Drugs
N/A	N/A

88. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N): N/A

89. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual	Mid Train c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual	Rear End c. Remote
(1) Total in Train	0	0	0	0	0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

90. Cars	Loaded a. Freight	Loaded b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight	Empty d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Equipment Consist	0	0	0	0	0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

91. Equipment Damage This Consist: $0.00

92. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage: $0.00

93. Primary Cause Code: N/A

94. Contributing Cause Code: N/A

Number of Crew Members

95. Engineer/ Operators	96. Firemen	97. Conductors	98. Brakemen
0	0	0	0

Length of Time on Duty

99. Engineer/Operator: Hrs 0 Mi 0

100. Conductor: Hrs 0 Mi 0

Casualties to:	101. Railroad Employees	102. Train	103. Other
Fatal	0	0	0
Nonfatal	0	0	0

104. EOT 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

105. Was EOT Device Properly 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

106. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

Highway User Involved

107. Code:
A. Auto; B. Truck; C. Truck-Trailer.; D. Pick-Up Truck; E. Van; F. Bus; G. School Bus; H. Motorcycle; J. Other Motor Vehicle; K. Pedestrian; M. Other *(spec. in narrative)*: N/A

108. Vehicle Speed *(est. MPH at impact)*: N/A

109. *geographical)* Code: 1.North 2.South 3.East 4.West: N/A

Rail Equipment Involved

111. Equipment Code:
1.Train *(units pulling)*; 2.Train *(units pushing)*; 3.Train *(standing)*; 4.Car(s) *(moving)*; 5.Car(s) *(standing)*; 6.Light Loco(s) *(moving)*; 7.Light(s) *(standing)*; 8.Other *(specify in narrative)*: N/A

112. Position of Car Unit in: 0

110. Position	Code	113. Circumstance	Code
1.Stalled on Crossing 2.Stopped on Crossing 3.Moving Over Crossing 4. Trapped	N/A	1. Rail Equipment Struck Highway User 2. Rail Equipment Struck by Highway User	N/A
114a. Was the highway user and/or rail equipment involved in the impact transporting hazardous materials? 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither	N/A	114b. Was there a hazardous materials release 1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither	N/A
114c. State here the name and quantity of the hazardous materials released, if any. N/A			

115. Type Crossing Warning	1.Gates 2.Cantilever FLS 3.Standard FLS	4.Wig Wags 5.Hwy. traffic signals 6.Audible	7.Crossbucks 8.Stop signs 9.Watchman	10.Flagged by crew 11.Other *(spec. in narr.)* 12.None	116. Signaled Crossing *(See instructions for codes)* Code	117. Whistle Ban Code 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown
Code(s)	N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A				N/A	N/A

118. Location of Warning Code 1. Both Sides 2. Side of Vehicle Approach 3. Opposite Side of Vehicle Approach	119. Crossing Warning with Highway Signals Code 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	120. Crossing Illuminated by Street Lights or Special Lights Code 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A

121. Age	122. Driver's Gender Code 1. Male 2. Female	123. Driver Drove Behind or in Front of and Struck or was Struck by Second Train Code 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	124. Driver Code 1. Drove around or thru the Gate 2. Stopped and then Proceeded 3. Did not Stop 4. Stopped on Crossing 5. Other *(specify in narrative)*
0	N/A	N/A	N/A

125. Driver Passed Highway Vehicle Code 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown	126. View of Track Obscured by *(primary obstruction)* Code 1. Permanent Structure 2. Standing Railroad Equipment 3. Passing Train 4. Topography 5. Vegetation 6. Highway Vehicle 7. Other *(specify in narrative)* 8. Not obstructed
N/A	N/A

Casualties to:	Killed	Injured	127. Driver Code 1. Killed 2.Injured 3. Uninjured	128. Was Driver in the Vehicle? Code 1. Yes 2. No
			N/A	N/A
129. Highway-Rail Crossing Users	0	0	130. Highway Vehicle Property Damage *(est. dollar damage)* 0	131. Total Number of Highway-Rail Crossing Users *(include driver)* 0

132. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights? Code 1. Yes 2. No	N/A	133. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights Operational? Code 1. Yes 2. No	N/A
134. Locomotive Headlight Illuminated? Code 1. Yes 2. No	N/A	135. Locomotive Audible Warning Sounded? Code 1. Yes 2. No	N/A

136. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.

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136. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.



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137. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

On November 13, 2008 at 7:10 a. m. CST, Union Pacific Railroad (UP), northbound freight train MHOSH-13 collided with a standing UP hi-rail vehicle at milepost 218.7, at a recorded speed of 29 mph. The signal maintainer operating the hi-rail vehicle occupied the Main Track without authority. The collision occurred 20 feet south of Rankin Road crossing in Spring, Texas, on the Palestine Subdivision, Houston Service Unit.

There were no reportable injuries to the train crew or signal maintainer. The hi-rail vehicle was totally destroyed and had an estimated value of $75,000.00. The lead locomotive sustained minor damage.

The accident was caused by the signal maintainer improperly repeating Track and Time limits of Authority to the train dispatcher. Also a factor was the train dispatcher's failure to listen and correct the signal maintainer's incorrect read back.

At the time of the collision, it was dawn, heavy fog, with 5 mph winds from the northeast. The temperature was 60º F.

Probable Cause:

The collision occurred because the train dispatcher failed to listen to the job briefing from the signal maintainer requesting limits. The signal maintainer failed to listen to the repeat on the limits from the third shift train dispatcher was going to grant. The train dispatcher failed to listen to the improper limits repeated by the signal maintainer before granting Authority to occupy the Main Track with Track and Time.

138. NARRATIVE

CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

HI-RAIL VEHICLE:

After receiving more than the required statutory off duty rest period, the Union Pacific (UP) signal maintainer went on duty at 4 a.m. CST on November 13, 2008. The signal maintainer departed his residence and proceeded to Rankin Road, milepost 218.7 arriving at 5:15 a.m. The signal maintainer contacted the UP Spring Dispatcher Position DS 42 via radio to obtain Track and Time authority to place his hi-rail vehicle on the Main Track for the purposes of performing repairs to a wayside signal. The method of operation is Centralized Traffic Control (CTC).

The third shift train dispatcher DS 42 went on duty at the UP Spring Dispatch Center at 10:20 p.m. on November 12, 2008. UP Train dispatcher DS 42 received more than the required statutory off duty rest period. At 5:23 a.m., the signal maintainer contacted the train dispatcher via radio to request Track and Time from location CPH 215 switch to CPH 225 switch. The train dispatcher asked the signal maintainer during the job briefing if he was requesting Track and Time from CPH 220 to CPH 225. The signal maintainer stated that was correct. The train dispatcher issued Track and Time permit number 4019 on Main Track Number One from CPH 220 switch to CPH 225 switch. The signal maintainer repeated Track and Time permit number 4019 to affirm limits of authority from CPH 215 Main Track One switch, to CPH 225 Main Track One switch, blocked until 6:00 a.m. At 5:25 a.m. the train dispatcher granted Track and Time permit number 4019 from CPH 220 switch, to CPH 225 switch. UP Train dispatcher DS-42 conducted a transfer job briefing with his relief, the first shift dispatcher, and went off duty at 6:40 a.m.

Shortly after receiving Track and Time Authority, the signal maintainer placed his hi-rail vehicle on Main Track One at Rankin Road crossing, milepost 218.7, which was outside the limits of his authorized Track and Time authority. The signal maintainer operated his hi-rail vehicle to CPH 221.6 on Main Track One and effected repairs to a wayside signal. After completing repairs the signal maintainer operated his hi-rail vehicle south on Main Track One to MP 218.7. At 6:45 a.m. the signal maintainer stopped his hi-rail vehicle south of

Rankin Road crossing to let highway vehicular traffic clear up. The track that crosses Rankin Road is tangent and essentially flat in both directions. Visibility from the railroad right-of-way in both directions approaching Rankin Road is about one mile north and south on a clear day.

UP TRAIN MHOSH-13:

The train crew of UP Train MHOSH-13 consisted of a locomotive engineer and conductor. Both crewmembers went on duty on November 13, 2008 at 3 a.m. at UP Englewood Yard in Houston, TX. Both crewmembers received more than the required statutory off duty rest period. The train crew was transported by limousine from Englewood Yard to Settegast Yard and arrived at their train at approximately 5:15 a.m. UP Train MHOSH-13 consisted of two locomotives, eight loads, and 20 empty freight cars. At 6 a.m. UP Yard Mechanical forces completed a Class I brake test on UP Train MHOSH-13. The railroad timetable direction of the train was north. Timetable directions are used throughout this report.

At 6:07 a.m. UP Train MHOSH-13 departed Settegast Yard en route to Palestine, TX. The train crew passed yard limits at 6:30 a.m. on Main Track Two. After arriving at Control Point (CP) 220, the train crew had a diversion clear signal indication at 7:04 a.m. and proceeded to Main Track One with a maximum authorized speed through the turn at 30 mph. After the train cleared the turnout from Main Track Two to Main Track One at less than 30 mph, the engineer began to increase the train speed to 41 mph. The engineer was seated at the control stand on the right side of the locomotive. The conductor was seated on the fireman's side looking out the front window. Approaching the accident site the track is tangent and essentially flat. Both crew members observed a headlight on the Main Track at which time the engineer placed the train in emergency. The train was approximately 2,400 feet from the standing hi-rail vehicle when the engineer placed the train in emergency.

THE ACCIDENT

HI-RAIL VEHICLE:

UP Train MHOSH-13 collided with the standing hi-rail vehicle at 7:10 a.m. at a recorded speed of 29 mph. The hi-rail vehicle was standing outside the legal authorized limits of Track and Time authority at the time of collision. The signal maintainer's view was limited due to dense fog. Visibility at the time of the collision was approximately 1 tenth of a mile. The maximum authorized speed for this segment of track is 60 mph for freight trains and 70 mph for passenger trains, as designated in the current UP Houston Area Timetable No. 4. When the signal maintainer noticed the headlight of the approaching train he exited the vehicle and got clear. The train struck the hi-rail vehicle head on and moved the vehicle approximately 240 feet north of Rankin Road.

UP TRAIN MHOSH-13:

UP Train MHOSH-13 was moving at 41 mph approximately 2,400 feet south of the point of the impact. The train crew stated they noticed the headlights from the hi-rail vehicle about one half mile in the distance, but initially thought it was a highway motor vehicle near Rankin Road crossing. Due to the heavy fog, the train crew could not clearly distinguish the hi-rail vehicle or assess the impending collision until seconds later. Once the engineer and conductor realized the hi-rail vehicle was facing them and on the Main Track the engineer initiated an emergency application of the train air brakes. The train was traveling at a recorded speed of 29 mph at the point of impact. The maximum authorized speed for this segment of track is 60 mph. The train came to a stop approximately 240 feet north of Rankin Road.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

ANALYSIS-TOXICOLOGICAL TESTING:

Post accident toxicological testing performed under railroad authority was negative for the signal maintainer and third trick train dispatcher. No toxicological testing was performed on the locomotive engineer or conductor assigned to UP Train MHOSH-13 or the first trick train dispatcher.

CONCLUSION:

Intoxication was not a factor.

ANALYSIS-FATIGUE:

FRA concluded fatigue was not probable cause for the following employees; first trick train dispatcher, locomotive engineer, or the signal maintainer.

FRA concluded fatigue was probable for cause for the following employees, first trick train dispatcher and conductor assigned to UP Train MHOSH-13.

ANALYSIS-DISPATCHER
Voice recording of third trick train dispatcher issuance of Track and Time Authority to the signal maintainer revealed the train dispatcher failed to listen to the job briefing of requested Track and Time from the signal maintainer. The UP Train dispatcher failed to listen to the repeat of Track and Time from the signal maintainer before issuing Authority. Track and Time documentation obtained from the dispatching center and the signal maintainer validates the findings.

Analysis of training records obtained from Spring Dispatching Center indicate that the third trick train dispatcher was trained and qualified in the proper procedures on issuance of Track and Time Authority and radio procedures.

CONCLUSION:

The Third trick train dispatcher was not in compliance of Union Pacific's Dispatching rules 20.8.1 requirements for granting and releasing authority, dispatching rule 20.8.2 confirmation of limits prior to granting authority and Federal requirements for radio transmission of mandatory directives under 49 CFR 220.61.B4.

ANALYSIS-SIGNAL MAINTAINER

Voice recordings of the conversation between the third trick train dispatcher and signal maintainer obtained from Union Pacific's dispatching center revealed the signal maintainer failed to listen to the train dispatchers read back request of Track and Time Authority. Signal maintainer failed to repeat the Track and Time issued by the train dispatcher. Track and Time documentation obtained from the signal maintainer indicated Track and Time granted by the train dispatcher was not written down and indicated the wrong location.

Training records and discipline records for the signal maintainer was obtained from the Union Pacific Railroad and analyzed for meeting training requirements and compliance.

CONCLUSION:

The Signal maintainer was trained and qualified in proper radio communications for requesting Track and Time Authority. The Signal maintainer failed on equipment condition, clean up procedures. The Signal maintainer was tested and passed on personal protection equipment, work procedures, fire prevention, tool condition, in track safety during the 2008 period.

The UP Signal maintainer failed to comply with GCOR 2.14 mandatory directives, maintenance of way rule 42.4.1 requesting Track and Time Authority, Federal Regulations 49 CFR 220.61A and 220.61B4. The Signal maintainer, while performing his duties on November 13, 2008, was outside his authority twice while on the Main Track.

ANALYSIS-LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEER OPERATING PERFORMANCE:

The locomotive was equipped with a speed indicator and an event recorder as required. The relevant event recorder data was down loaded by the Manager of Operating Practice and analyzed at the accident site.

CONCLUSION:

The locomotive engineer was in compliance with all applicable railroad and train handling requirements.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS:

The signal maintainer and third trick train dispatcher failed to comply with applicable railroad operating rules, dispatcher rules and Federal standards.

The train crew and first trick dispatcher were in full compliance with their own and all applicable Federal standards.

PROBABLE CAUSE & CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:

The collision occurred because the train dispatcher failed to listen to the job briefing from the signal maintainer requesting limits. The signal maintainer failed to listen to the repeat on the limits from the third trick train dispatcher. The train dispatcher failed to listen to the improper limits repeated by the signal maintainer before granting authority of Track and Time