Federal Railroad Administration
Office of Safety
Headquarters Assigned
Accident Investigation Report
HQ-2005-109

Union Pacific (UP)
Lane, Kansas
December 22, 2005

Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT

FRA File # HQ-2005-109

1.Name of Railroad Operating Train #1: Union Pacific RR Co. [UP]	1a. Alphabetic Code: UP	1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.: 1205WH009
2.Name of Railroad Operating Train #2: Union Pacific RR Co. [UP]	2a. Alphabetic Code: UP	2b. Railroad Accident/Incident: 1205WH009
3.Name of Railroad Responsible for Track Maintenance: Union Pacific RR Co. [UP]	3a. Alphabetic Code: UP	3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.: 1205WH009
4. U.S. DOT_AAR Grade Crossing Identification Number	5. Date of Accident/Incident: Month 12 / Day 22 / Year 2005	6. Time of Accident/Incident: 06:22: ☐ AM ☑ PM

7. Type of Accident/Indicent *(single entry in code box)*: 1. Derailment; 2. Head on collision; 3. Rear end collision; 4. Side collision; 5. Raking collision; 6. Broken Train collision; 7. Hwy-rail crossing; 8. RR grade crossing; 9. Obstruction; 10. Explosion-detonation; 11. Fire/violent rupture; 12. Other impacts; 13. Other *(describe in narrative)*: 04

8. Cars Carrying HAZMAT	9. HAZMAT Cars Damaged/Derailed	10. Cars Releasing HAZMAT	11. People Evacuated	12. Division
0	0	0	0	Wichita

13. Nearest City/Town	14. Milepost *(to nearest tenth)*	15. State Abbr	15. State Code	16. County
Lane	343.5	N/A	KS	FRANKLIN

17. Temperature (F) *(specify if minus)*	18. Visibility *(single entry)* 1. Dawn 2. Day 3.Dusk 4.Dark	Code	19. Weather (single entry) 1. Clear 2. Cloudy 3. Rain 4. Fog 5.Sleet 6.Snow	Code	20. Type of Track 1. Main 2. Yard 3. Siding 4. Industry	Code
45 F		4		2		1

21. Track Name/Number	22. FRA Track Class (1-9, X)	Code	23. Annual Track Density *(gross tons in millions)*	24. Time Table Direction 1. North 3. East	Code
Main Track No 1		3	7.0		2

OPERATING TRAIN #1

25. Type of Equipment Consist *(single entry)* 1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train 4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars 7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s). 9. Maint./inspect.car A. Spec. MoW Equip.	Code	26. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No	Code	27. Train Number/Symbol
	1	1	1	CJROL920

28. Speed *(recorded speed, if available)* R - Recorded; E - Estimated: 1 MPH | Code: R

29. Trailing Tons *(gross tonnage, excluding power units)*: 16244

30. Method(s) of Operation *(enter code(s) that apply)*: a. ATCS; b. Auto train control; c. Auto train stop; d. Cab; e. Traffic; f. Interlocking; g. Automatic block; h. Current of traffic; i. Time table/train orders; j.Track warrant control; k. Direct traffic control; l.Yard limits; m.Special instructions; n. Other than main track; o. Positive train control; p. Other *(Specify in narrative)*

Code(s): e | l | m | N/A | N/A

30a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive? 0 = Not a remotely controlled; 1 = Remote control portable; 2 = Remote control tower; 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter: 0

31. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded *(yes/no)*
(1) First involved *(derailed, struck, etc)*	N/A	1	N/A
(2) Causing *(if mechanical cause reported)*	N/A	N/A	N/A

32. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.

Alcohol	Drugs
0	0

33. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N): N

34. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual	Mid Train c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual	Rear End c. Remote
(1) Total in Train	2	0	0	0	1
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

35. Cars	Loaded a. Freight	Loaded b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight	Empty d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Equipment Consist	118	0	0	0	0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

36. Equipment Damage This Consist	37. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage	38. Primary Cause Code	39. Contributing Cause Code
60000	0	H401	N/A

Number of Crew Members

40. Engineer/ Operators	41. Firemen	42. Conductors	43. Brakemen
1	0	2	0

Length of Time on Duty

44. Engineer/Operator	45. Conductor
Hrs 6 Mi 15	Hrs 6 Mi 15

Casualties to:	46. Railroad Employees	47. Train Passengers	48. Other
Fatal	0	0	0
Nonfatal	N/A	0	0

49. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No: 2

50. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

51. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No: N/A

OPERATING TRAIN #2

52. Type of Equipment Consist *(single entry)* 1. Freight train 2. Passenger train 3. Commuter train 4. Work train 5. Single car 6. Cut of cars 7. Yard/switching 8. Light loco(s). 9. Maint./inspect.car A. Spec. MoW Equip.	Code	53. Was Equipment Attended? 1. Yes 2. No	Code	54. Train Number/Symbol
	1	1	1	CFGAT921

55. Speed *(recorded speed, if available)* R - Recorded; E - Estimated: 14 MPH | Code: E

57. Method(s) of Operation *(enter code(s) that apply)*: a. ATCS; b. Auto train control; g. Automatic block; h. Current of traffic; m.Special instructions; n. Other than main track

57a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive? 0 = Not a remotely controlled; 1 = Remote control portable

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56. Trailing Tons *(gross tonnage, excluding power units)*	c. Auto train stop d. Cab e. Traffic f. Interlocking	i. Time table/train orders j.Track warrant control k. Direct traffic control l.Yard limits	o. Positive train control p. Other *(Specify in narrative)* Code(s)	2 = Remote control tower 3 = Remote control transmitter - more than one remote control transmitter
2881			e N/A N/A N/A N/A	0

58. Principal Car/Unit	a. Initial and Number	b. Position in Train	c. Loaded *(yes/no)*
(1) First involved *(derailed, struck, etc)*	OGEX 2637	49	no
(2) Causing *(if mechanical cause reported)*	0	N/A	N/A

59. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/alcohol use, enter the number that were positive in the appropriate box.

Alcohol	Drugs
0	0

60. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N) N

61. Locomotive Units	a. Head End	Mid Train b. Manual	Mid Train c. Remote	Rear End d. Manual	Rear End c. Remote
(1) Total in Train	2	0	0	0	1
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

62. Cars	Loaded a. Freight	Loaded b. Pass.	Empty c. Freight	Empty d. Pass.	e. Caboose
(1) Total in Equipment Consist	0	0	131	0	0
(2) Total Derailed	0	0	0	0	0

63. Equipment Damage This Consist: 690000

64. Track, Signal, Way, & Structure Damage: 0

65. Primary Cause Code: H401

66. Contributing Cause Code: N/A

Number of Crew Members

67. Engineer/ Operators	68. Firemen	69. Conductors	70. Brakemen
1	0	1	0

Length of Time on Duty

71. Engineer/Operator: Hrs 4 Mi 20

72. Conductor: Hrs 4 Mi 20

Casualties to:	73. Railroad Employees	74. Train Passengers	75. Other
Fatal	0	0	0
Nonfatal	0	0	0

76. EOT Device? 1. Yes 2. No | 2

77. Was EOT Device Properly Armed? 1. Yes 2. No | N/A

78. Caboose Occupied by Crew? 1. Yes 2. No | N/A

Highway User Involved

79. Type — Code: N/A
A. Auto B. Truck C. Truck-Trailer. D. Pick-Up Truck E. Van F. Bus G. School Bus H. Motorcycle J. Other Motor Vehicle K. Pedestrian M. Other *(spec. in narrative)*

80. Vehicle Speed *(est. MPH at impact)*: N/A

81. Direction *(geographical)* — Code: N/A
1.North 2.South 3.East 4.West

82. Position — Code: N/A
1.Stalled on Crossing 2.Stopped on Crossing 3.Moving Over Crossing 4. Trapped

86a. Was the highway user and/or rail equipment involved in the impact transporting hazardous materials? — Code: N/A
1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither

Rail Equipment Involved

83. Equipment — Code: N/A
1.Train *(units pulling)* 2.Train *(units pushing)* 3.Train *(standing)* 4.Car(s) *(moving)* 5.Car(s) *(standing)* 6.Light Loco(s) *(moving)* 7.Light(s) *(standing)* 8.Other *(specify in narrative)*

84. Position of Car Unit in Train: N/A

85. Circumstance — Code: N/A
1. Rail Equipment Struck Highway User
2. Rail Equipment Struck by Highway User

86b. Was there a hazardous materials release by — Code: N/A
1. Highway User 2. Rail Equipment 3. Both 4. Neither

86c. State here the name and quantity of the hazardous materials released, if any.
N/A

87. Type of Crossing Warning — Code(s): N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1.Gates 2.Cantilever FLS 3.Standard FLS 4.Wig Wags 5.Hwy. traffic signals 6.Audible 7.Crossbucks 8.Stop signs 9.Watchman 10.Flagged by crew 11.Other *(spec. in narr.)* 12.None

88. Signaled Crossing Warning Code *(See instructions for codes)*: N/A

89. Whistle Ban — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown

90. Location of Warning — Code: N/A
1. Both Sides 2. Side of Vehicle Approach 3. Opposite Side of Vehicle Approach

91. Crossing Warning Interconnected with Highway Signals — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown

92. Crossing Illuminated by Street Lights or Special Lights — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown

93. Driver's Age: 0

94. Driver's Gender — Code: N/A
1. Male 2. Female

95. Driver Drove Behind or in Front of Train and Struck or was Struck by Second Train — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown

96. Driver — Code: N/A
1. Drove around or thru the Gate 2. Stopped and then Proceeded 3. Did not Stop 4. Stopped on Crossing 5. Other *(specify in narrative)*

97. Driver Passed Standing Highway Vehicle — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown

98. View of Track Obscured by *(primary obstruction)* — Code: N/A
1. Permanent Structure 2. Standing Railroad Equipment 3. Passing Train 4. Topography 5. Vegetation 6. Highway Vehicle 7. Other *(specify in narrative)* 8. Not obstructed

101. Casulties to Highway-Rail Crossing Users	Killed	Injured
	0	0

99. Driver Was — Code: N/A
1. Killed 2.Injured 3. Uninjured

100. Was Driver in the Vehicle? — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No

102. Highway Vehicle Property Damage *(est. dollar damage)*: 0

103. Total Number of Highway-Rail Crossing Users *(include driver)*: 0

104. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights? — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No

105. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights Operational? — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No

106. Locomotive Headlight Illuminated? — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No

107. Locomotive Audible Warning Sounded? — Code: N/A
1. Yes 2. No

108. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.
HQ-109.gif



109. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

On December 22, 2005, a southbound Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) Train Symbol CJROL9-20, a loaded coal train, operating on main Track No. 1, passed the southbound absolute signal on main Track No. 1 at Control Point (CP) V343, railroad station Lane Jct., milepost 343.5, displaying a "Dark" aspect. The train crew placed the train brakes into "Emergency" when passing this signal while traveling at 12 mph, timetable authorized 55 mph, and proceeded another 237 feet into the "OS" section. This train stopped at 6:22 p.m. CST, upon side swiping a northbound train occupying the "OS" section.
The "OS" section, or over-switch, is defined as the trackage between the northbound and southbound absolute signals at this CP. This trackage includes the entire switch layout.
Main Track No. 1 is geographically located on the west with main Track No. 2 on the east. Southward from Lane Jct. is a single main track to Coffeyville, Kansas, a distance of 319.3 miles.
Northbound UP Train Symbol CFGAT9-21, an empty coal train operating at 14 mph, was proceeding from the Main Track on the diverging route to main Track No. 2 at CP V343, Lane Jct., at the time of the incident.
There was no equipment derailed with an estimated $750,000 in total damages. No train crew members reported any injuries, no hazmat was released and no evacuation order was issued.
Railroad station Lane Jct. is located in the southwest corner of Lane, Kansas. At the time of the incident, it was dark and the weather was cloudy with a calm wind and a temperature of 45 °F.
The accident occurred because the train crew of southbound UP Train Symbol CJROL9-20 failed to stop their train in the clear prior to passing the southbound absolute signal on main Track No. 1 at CP V343, Lane Jct., Lane, Kansas.

110. NARRATIVE

The following information was obtained from an investigation that was conducted by the FRA.
Circumstances Prior to the Accident
UP Train Symbol CJROL9-20 (Train No. 1)
The assigned loaded coal train consisted of 2 head-end locomotives (UP 7144 and UP 7097) and 1 DPU locomotive (UP 7216), 118 loads, no empties, 6,594 feet in length with 16,244 trailing gross tonnage. This train originated at the Jeremy Ranch Mine, Wyoming and was enroute to Oologah, Oklahoma. The train departed Kansas City at 1:45 p.m., December 22, enroute to Coffeyville, Kansas.
This train had received a "Class 1 Brake Test-Initial Terminal" on December 21 at 6:13 p.m. in North Platte, Nebraska. The train was also designed as an "extended haul train" which allows this train to move up to, but not exceed, 1,500 miles between brake test and mechanical inspection.
The train crew consisted of a locomotive engineer, conductor pilot, and conductor. They had reported for duty on December 22, at 12:05 p.m. in Kansas City, Missouri, their home terminal. All crew members had received more than the statutory off duty period, prior to reporting for duty. This train crew's employment and qualification dates are:

Engineer - 2 years and promoted on 10/18/2005
Conductor - 5 months and promoted on 7/25/05
Conductor Pilot - 1.5 years and promoted on 4/19/04

The conductor pilot was assigned to this crew to supervise the conductor on his second territory familiarization trip as part of the qualification process.
As this southbound train approached the accident area, the locomotive engineer was seated at the controls on the right (west) side of the lead/controlling locomotive. The conductor was seated on the left (east) side and the conductor pilot was seated in the center of the cab of the lead/controlling locomotive.
Approaching the accident area from the north, there are, in succession from MP 342.76 a 3-degree 4-minute left-hand curve of approximately 2,270 feet, followed by a tangent of 370 feet, then a 1,109 foot 2-degree 54-minute right-hand curve to the switch point at MP 343.47. This trackage is on a relatively level grade.
UP Train Symbol CFGAT9-21 (Train No. 2)
The assigned empty coal train consisted of 2 head-end locomotives (UP 6027 and UP 7371) and 1 DPU

locomotive (UP 8156), no loads, 131 empties, 7,277 feet in length with 2,881 trailing gross tonnage. This train originated in Fort Gibson, Oklahoma and was enroute to the Antelope Mine, Wyoming. The train departed Coffeyville at 2:23 p.m. enroute to Kansas City, Missouri.

The train crew consisted of a locomotive engineer and conductor. They had reported for duty on December 22, at 2:00 p.m. in Coffeyville. The home terminal for this train crew is Kansas City, and all had received more than the statutory off duty period, prior to reporting for duty. The crews service and qualification dates are:

Engineer - 2 years and promoted on 7/13/2005
Conductor - 1 year and promoted on 5/17/2004

As this northbound train approached the accident area, the locomotive engineer was seated at the controls on the right (east) side, with the conductor seated on the left (west) side, in the cab of the lead/controlling locomotive.

Approaching the accident area from the south, there are in succession, from MP 344.22 a 4-degree 4-minute, left-hand curve of approximately 1,003 feet; followed by a tangent of 53 feet, then a 2,693 foot 3-degree 6-minute right-hand curve, and a tangent for 211 feet to the switch point at MP 343.47. This trackage is on a relatively level grade.

The Accident

The UP operates on the Wichita Division, Coffeyville Subdivision from Kansas City, Missouri, milepost 284.7, southward to Coffeyville, Kansas, milepost 662.8, a distance of 378.1 miles. The method of operation is by signal indication of a Traffic Control System (TCS) supplemented by timetable and special instructions.

This TCS is remotely-controlled by the UP train dispatcher located at the Co-Located Dispatching Center in Kansas City, Kansas.

In the vicinity of the accident, the UP operates over two main tracks southward from Osawatomie, Kansas, milepost 333.0, to Lane Jct., milepost 343.5, a distance of 10.5 miles. Main Track No. 1 on the west with main Track No. 2 on the east. Southward from Lane Jct. is a single main track to Coffeyville, a distance of 319.3 miles. Lane Jct. is located in the southwest corner of Lane, in Franklin County, Kansas.

The UP Kansas City Area Timetable No. 2, with an effective date of October 28, 2001, maximum authorized speed is 60 mph for freight movements only. A speed restriction of 55 mph was in effect from milepost 341.8 to milepost 343.5 and 50 mph from milepost 343.5 to milepost 344.2 via Coffeyville Subdivision General Order No. 11, dated December 05, 2005. An additional timetable "Tonnage Restrictions" was in effect restricting to 55 mph if train averages over 90 tons per operative brake or 50 mph if train averages over 110 tons per operative brake between Osawatomie and Coffeyville.

The TCS signal equipment associated with this accident consists of colorlight-type signals (US&S), DC electronically-coded (Electro-Code) main track circuits, DC non-coded track circuits (OS section), and a power-operated dual-controlled switch machine (US&S).

The track structure in the vicinity of the accident consists of 136-lb and 133-lb Continuous-Welded Rail (CWR) mounted on wooden crossties. The switch at Lane Jct. is a northbound right-hand No. 20 turnout with a speed restriction of 40 mph for a diverging movement.

UP Train Symbol CJROL9-20

This southbound train had passed southward intermediate Signal No. 34131 (MP 341.25) on main Track No. 1 displaying a "Yellow" aspect at 44 mph. This displayed indication instructs the train crew to:

UP System Special Instructions
Revised, April 3, 2005
Rule - 9.2.6 Name - Approach . Indication - Proceed prepared to stop before any part of train or engine passes the next signal. Freight trains exceeding 30 MPH must immediately reduce to 30 MPH.

This displayed aspect was acknowledged by the train crew at 6:12 p.m. and recorded by the conductor on the "UP Conductor Report" form. The next signal is the southbound absolute signal at Lane Jct., a distance of 2.25 miles.

This train was being operated at a decreasing speed from 44 mph to 12 mph while approaching the accident area. At the time of the accident, the train was being operated at 1 mph. The speeds were recorded by the event recorder of the lead/controlling locomotive.

As this train approached Lane Jct., the train crew observed that the southbound absolute signal on main Track No. 1 was "Dark." This signal is located on the west side (right) of main Track No. 1 with a preview distance of approximately 1,500 feet. There is a mature forest and ground vegetation on both sides of the track obstructing an earlier preview. The train crew did observe a northbound train on the adjacent track to the east on main Track No. 2.

The train crew realized that they were not going to be able to stop as the train passed the absolute signal at Lane Jct. The engineer made an emergency application of the train's brakes. This train continued for another 237 feet prior to coming to a stop following a side swipe collision with the northbound train on main Track No.

2. This trains lead/controlling locomotives left front initially collided with the 49th car of the northbound train. When the train was stopped, the train crew instructed the northbound train via radio to stop account of the side swipe collision. This trains crew members remained in the cab of the locomotive until both trains were at stop. There was no derailment of the locomotives or cars associated with this train. This train consist contained no hazardous materials. No crew member reported being injured and did not request medical attention following the accident.

UP Train Symbol CFGAT9-21

This northbound train was being operated at a decreasing speed from 41 mph to 14 mph while approaching the accident area. This train passed the northbound absolute signal at Lane Jct. on the Main Track displaying a "Red over Green" aspect at 14 mph. This displayed "Diverging Clear" indication instructs the train crew to "Proceed on diverging route not exceeding prescribed speed through turnout." This diverging route is from the Main Track to main Track No. 2.

The train was brought to a controlled stop following instructions via radio from the southbound train on the adjacent track to the west, main Track No. 1.

At the time of the accident, the train was being operated at 14 mph. The speeds were recorded by the event recorder of the lead/controlling locomotive.

There was no derailment of the locomotives or cars associated with this train. This train consist contained no hazardous materials. Cars No. 49 through 118 (69-total) were damaged prior to the train stopping as a result of this collision. Neither crew member reported being injured nor requested medical attention following the accident.

This train crew reported the accident to the UP train dispatcher via radio at 6:33 p.m. and requested a manager be dispatched to the accident site. The train dispatcher notified the local law enforcement dispatcher of the accident at 6:41 p.m. .

The locomotive engineer remained in the cab of the locomotive in order to maintain radio communications with the train dispatcher following the accident. The conductor walked back (south) to the point of the accident inspecting the train for damage and any derailments.

Analysis and Conclusions

Analysis

The UP downloaded the event recorders of both trains lead/controlling locomotives at the accident site. Upon review, no exceptions were noted to locomotive or train performance, or train handling prior to the accident by either train crew.

The southbound UP Train Symbol CJROL9-20 had received a "brake test-initial terminal" prior to departure from its initial terminal. The incident train crew did not perform an air brake test prior to departing Kansas City in that this was an "extended haul train" with no exceptions noted by the previous train crew.

The performance of the wayside signal system was tested on December 23, in the presence of the FRA accident Inspector-in-Charge (IIC). This testing was performed by the UP Manager Signal Maintenance (Kansas City), the signal testman and two signal maintainers. The results of this TCS testing confirmed that the wayside signal system in the vicinity of the accident was operating as intended and designed. The test also confirmed that the southbound absolute signal on main Track No. 1 at Lane Jct. was "Dark" as reported by the incident train crew. The red position lamp was in fact burned out and was replaced at the time of the investigation. The yellow and green position lamps were functioning properly.

During this field testing of this wayside signal system, the southbound absolute signal on main Track No. 2 was also "Dark." This signal is located on the east side of main Track No. 2, adjacent to the signal on main Track No. 1. The red position lamp was not illuminated account of an intermittent lamp socket connection which was replaced at the time of the investigation. The yellow and green position lamps were functioning properly.

The train crew of UP Train Symbol CJROL9-20 accepted responsibility for the accident. They elected to enroll in the UP's Continuing Operating Rules Education Program (CORE) and are currently being retrained in each of their occupations. Each crew member received a 30-day suspension and would be eligible to return to duty on January 22, 2006 following a successful completion of CORE. There was no formal investigation conducted by the UP account of the train crew accepting responsibility.

The UP collected Toxicological (TOX) samples from both train crews in accordance with company policy of reasonable cause, with negative results. The TOX samples for the three incident train crew members where not obtained in accordance with FRA's Post-Accident Toxicological Testing requirements (49 CFR Part 219, Subpart C).

Conclusions

The wayside signal system was operating as intended and within the UP and FRA's regulatory guidelines. The incident train's locomotive and consist mechanical functions were operating as intended and within the UP's regulatory guidelines. The incident train crew did not indicate any problems with the train or its performance, nor with the movement authority prior to the accident. The incident train crews drug and alcohol TOX testing

results indicated negatively for a foreign substance influence. A review of the incident train crews recent efficiency testing results, indicates compliance with UP's General Code of Operating Rules (GCOR) and company safety rules.

Probable Cause and Contributing Factors

The probable cause of this accident is FRA code H401- Failure to stop train in clear. The accident occurred because the train crew of southbound UP Train Symbol CJROL9-20 failed to stop their train in the clear prior to passing the dark southbound absolute signal on main Track No. 1 at CP V343, Station Lane Jct., Lane, Kansas.

There were no contributing factors involved in this accident.